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ESSENTIALLY CONTESTED CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONS
MARK A. GRABER*
“Constitutional Revolution” is an essentially contested concept that
“inevitably involves endless disputes about . . . proper uses on the part
of . . . users.”1 The meaning of such essentially contested concepts as
“constitutional revolution,” “democracy,” “liberty,” and the like depends on
debatable normative propositions. Jeremy Waldron observes, “only
normative concepts with a certain internal complexity are capable of being
essentially contested.”2 One cannot determine whether the United States is a
democracy without assessing state equality in the Senate and the Electoral
College. Whether a constitutional revolution has taken place depends on
contested theories of constitutionalism and political development.
Both halves of “constitutional revolution” are essentially contested.
“Constitutionalism” is an essentially contested concept. Walter Murphy
maintains that constitutionalism is committed to protecting a set of
fundamental liberties.3 Ran Hirschl insists that constitutional theocracies that
do not protect liberal liberties are as constitutional as constitutional
democracies that do protect liberal liberties.4 “Revolution” is as essentially
contested a concept. A.E. Howard asserts that the American revolution was
* Regents Professor, University of Maryland Carey School of Law. Thank you to Carly Brody
and the Maryland Law Review staff. Special thank you to the contributors and all participants in
the Schmooze.
1. W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167, 169
(1955–56).
2. Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (In Florida)?, 21
LAW & PHIL. 137, 150 (2002).
3. See generally WALTER F. MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: CREATING AND
MAINTAINING A JUST POLITICAL ORDER (2007).
4. See generally RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY (2010).
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not really a revolution. He noted, “the American revolution is a kind of
oddity among revolutions. It was fought to preserve old values—indeed to
preserve values which had sprung up from the very country rebelled against,
but which that country had somehow forgotten.”5 Gordon Wood responds
that a real revolution took place in the United States during the late eighteenth
century as monarchial social relations were replaced by republican social
relations, which in turn were replaced by democratic social relations. “[T]he
American Revolution was very different from other revolutions,” Wood
admits, “[b]ut it was no less radical and no less social for being different.”6
Murphy, Hirschl, Howard and Wood are not disputing facts about
constitutional regimes. Differences over the place of human rights and the
rule of law in constitutionalism drive the dispute between Murphy and
Hirschl. Differences over the place of governance and social relations in
revolutions, as well as over what counts as a fundamental change in social
relations, drives the dispute between Howard and Wood.
Gary Jacobsohn and Yaniv Roznai’s magnificent Constitutional
Revolution7 demonstrates how combining two essentially contested concepts
geometrically increases definitional complexity. Jacobsohn and Roznai
insist that a constitutional revolution occurs when a fundamental change
occurs “in the substance of a polity’s constitutional identity.”8 Such a
revolution may occur when a constitutional text is replaced or modified,9 but
as the case of Israel indicates, constitutional revolutions may occur by
interpretation as well as by revision of fundamental laws.10 This
understanding of constitutional revolution owes much to Walter Murphy’s
belief that constitutions were best understood in terms of certain fundamental
commitments11 rather than to a more classical view that understood
constitutionalism in terms of commitments to fundamental law.12
Complexity reigns even within the Jacobsohn/Roznai paradigm.
Constitutional regimes are notoriously disharmonic.13 They contain
different, often clashing, fundamental commitments. In such circumstances
5. A.E. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM
203 (1968).
6. GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5 (1993). For an
excellent discussion of whether the American Revolution was a real revolution, see Erin Ryan,
Secession and Federalism in the United States: Tools for Managing Regional Conflict in a Pluralist
Society, 96 OR. L. REV. 123, 134–141 (2017).
7. GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN & YANIV ROZNAI, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (2020).
8. Id. at 37.
9. Id. at 59–101.
10. Id. at 183–223.
11. See MURPHY, supra note 3, at 9–10.
12. See MARK A. GRABER, A NEW INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 24–
28 (2013).
13. See GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY 1–33 (2010).
IN AMERICA
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determining whether political figures are advancing a distinctive revolution
or are merely agents of a previous revolution may be difficult. Consider
Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln is often celebrated as the political figure who
helped bring about the second American Revolution.14 Lincoln, however,
repeatedly denied that he was a revolutionary. He claimed the Constitution
of the United States in 1857 was committed to the ultimate extinction of
slavery.15 Whether Lincoln was a revolutionary depends on a contested
interpretation of the antebellum constitution of the United States.16
The participants in the 2021 Maryland Constitutionalism Schmooze
play variations on constitutional revolution as an essentially contested
conception. That Schmooze brings together scholars of all generations across
the globe, representing political science, law, and other disciplines, for a
weekend conversation on a subject of constitutional interest, in the case of
2021, constitutional revolution. As is typical for an academic conversation,
linearity is often in short supply. Conversation wanders around important
points rather than remaining focused on a narrow topic. The perspectives
different scholars rooted in different disciplines from different generations
from different parts of the world bring to conversations are rarely fully
commensurate. Essentially contested concepts is the order of the day.
The representative samples of essays kindly published by the Maryland
Law Review highlight the normative challenges of defining constitutional
revolution. Some participants tackle conceptional matters directly. Sandy
Levinson explores the American Independence and the Civil War as
revolutions.17 Howard Schweber looks at the difference between a
constitutional revolution and a revolution in constitutionalism.18 Several
essays examine structures that might inhibit or further constitutional
revolutions. Richard Albert and Yaniv Roznai examine various means for
preventing precipitous constitutional amendments during emergencies.19
Conor Casey studies presidential capacity to initiate a constitutional

14. See JACOBSOHN & ROZNAI, supra note 7, at 1–2, 7.
15. Abraham Lincoln, First Debate with Stephen A. Douglas at Ottawa, Illinois, in 3
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 18 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
16. For discussions of Abraham Lincoln as or a constitutional revolutionary, see Gary Jeffrey
Jacobsohn, Was Abraham Lincoln a Constitutional Revolutionary?, 7 CONST. STUD. 77 (2021);
Mark A. Graber, The Post-Civil War Amendments as a Constitutional Revolution?, 7 CONST. STUD.
1 (2021).
17. Sanford Levinson, Are (American) Secessionists Necessarily Revolutionaries?, 81 MD. L.
REV. 217 (2021).
18. Howard Schweber, Constitutional Revolutions: The People, the Text, and the Hermenuetic
of Legitimation, 81 MD. L. REV. 226 (2021).
19. Richard Albert and Yaniv Roznai, Emergency Unamendability: Limitations on
Constitutional Amendments in Extreme Conditions, 81 MD. L. REV. 243 (2021).
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revolution through control over the bureaucracy.20 Julie Novkov explains
how private actors may have done more to prevent a constitutional revolution
during the American national election of 2020 than the institutional structures
detailed in The Federalist Papers.21 Other papers explore particular events
that might or might not be considered constitutional revolutions. Rivka Weill
examines whether the jurisprudence of the Israeli Supreme Court during
Israel’s recent succession crisis was revolutionary.22 Carol Nackenoff details
how the specter of minority control threatens a constitutional revolution that
would obliterate constitutional democracy in the United States.23 Whether
the events of January 6, 2021, constituted a constitutional revolution provides
the background for Jill Goldenziel’s discussion of the problematic response
to the mob taking over the Capitol.24 Finally, several authors outline
possibilities for what may or may not be a constitutional revolution. Rebecca
Zietlow details how the Thirteenth Amendment provides the foundation for
“a third Reconstruction.”25
Chris Chambers Goodman calls for a
constitutional revolution that will provide for greater political equality in
Congress.26 Robinson Woodward-Burns throws some cold water on these
proposals by detailing how counter-majoritarian Republican hardball may
forestall progressive constitutional revolutions, while promoting what might
be a conservative constitutional revolution.27
Professor Levinson’s essay highlights the contested nature of both
“revolution” and “secession.” Americans in 1776 and Confederates in 1860,
he points out, neither sought to take over a government nor repudiate the
principles on which that government was based. George Washington and
friends, Levinson notes, “were content to leave the British Empire as it
was.”28 Americans, Thomas Jefferson maintained, were claiming only their
inherited common law rights as Englishmen and were not seeking to create a

20. Conor Casey, Political Executive Control of the Administrative State: How Much is too
Much, 81 MD. L. REV. 257 (2021).
21. Julie Novkov, Donald Trump, Constitutional Failure, and the Guardrails of Democracy,
81 MD. L. REV. 276 (2021). For those institutional structures, see especially Alexander Hamilton,
James Madison, and John Jay, THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 320–25 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
22. Rivka Weill, Judicial Intervention in Parliamentary Affairs to Prevent a Coup D’état, 81
MD. L. REV. 297 (2021).
23. Carol Nackenoff, What Makes an American Constitutional Revolution, and Are We Having
One, 81 MD. L. REV. 320 (2021).
24. Jill I. Goldenziel, “Revolution” at the Capitol: How Law Hindered the Response to the
Events of January 6, 2021, 81 MD. L. REV. 336 (2021).
25. Rebecca Zietlow, A Third Reconstruction, 81 MD. L. REV. 351 (2021).
26. Chris Chambers Goodman, Constitutional Revolution: A Path Towards Equitable
Representation, 81 MD. L. REV. 366 (2021).
27. Robinson Woodward-Burns, Counter-Majoritarian Constitutional Hardball, 81 MD. L.
REV. 380 (2021).
28. Levinson, supra note 17, at 219.
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new regime based on entirely new political principles.29 Jefferson Davis and
friends, Levinson continues, lacked “a professed aim to take over the
American government” and did not “disaffirm[] the strictures of the United
States Constitution.”30 Davis and South Carolina fire-eaters insisted that the
right of secession was baked into the Declaration of Independence and
Constitution of the United States.31 Commentators who claim that Americans
in 1776 were revolutionaries rather than secessionists and that Confederates
in 1860 were traitors do so on a contested reading, respectively, of the English
constitution and Constitution of the United States. These contests over what
constitutes secession and revolution leave Levinson wondering whether
“these terms have any genuine analytic meaning or are instead merely terms
of political invective that should not, perhaps for that reason, be taken
seriously by academics.”32
Professor Schweber implies that neither the American Revolution nor
the Civil War were constitutional revolutions by claiming that a
transformation in the practice of constitutionalism is the defining
characteristic of a constitutional revolution. He writes, “a constitutional
revolution occurs when there is a change in the governing norms of
interpretation that alters the terms of legitimation.”33 Constitutional
legitimation has two distinctive paths. The first relies entirely on a founding,
“[a] past moment that was performative.”34 “Legitimation,” Schweber
claims, is “based on the assertion of ‘correct’ understanding.”35 The second
treats foundings as “material for performative intervention.”36 Legitimation
is a present act that understands the founding project to be “fundamentally
incomplete, and hence always subject to supplementation.”37 Government
may operate in fundamentally different ways and pursue fundamentally
different projects without a constitutional revolution when the practices of
legitimation remain constant. Schweber observes, “a shift in the hermeneutic
of constitutional legitimation may occur without any substantial change in
29. See Garry Wills, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
49–64 (1978).
30. Levinson, supra note 17, at 219–220.
31. Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States, Inaugural Address of the President of
the Provisional Government, reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM pt. 1,
at 156–57 (Mark A. Graber and Howard Gillman eds., 2018); Declaration of the Immediate Causes
Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union, reprinted in 5
THE COMPLETE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM pt. 1, supra, at 70–71. See Levinson, supra note
17, at 228–29.
32. Levinson, supra note 17, at 218.
33. Schweber, supra note 18, at 230.
34. Id. at 240.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 241.
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the arrangement or operations of political institutions and without dramatic
change in the content of legal rules; conversely, political and legal
revolutions may not constitute revolutions in constitutionalism.”38 If Thomas
Jefferson and King George III claimed to be the true heir to the Glorious
Revolution of 1688, and Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis claimed to be
the true heir of the Declaration of Independence, then what took place in 1776
and 1861 was merely a bloody squabble over how to interpret a past
revolution rather than a distinctive, new constitutional revolution.
The means for forestalling possible constitutional revolutions,
Professors Albert and Roznai suggest, are as problematic as the definition of
constitutional revolution. Their essay discusses possible restrictions during
emergencies on the constitutional amendment process that might prevent
autocratic or ill-considered reforms that undermine constitutional
democracy. “History has shown,” they point out, “that amendments in
emergency contexts sometimes generate a ‘constitutional revolution.’”39
Restrictions on constitutional amendments in emergencies may serve as vital
means for “protecting rights,” “frustrating abuses of power,” and “preserving
the constitutional order.”40 Undemocratic constitutional revolutions might
be forestalled, Professors Albert and Roznai detail, if judiciaries review
constitutional amendments for consistency with fundamental constitutional
principles, if all constitutional amendments passed in emergencies sunset
after a short period, or if those amendments remain good constitutional law
only if reaffirmed after the emergency.41 Professors Albert and Roznai
recognize that no restriction on amendments is a perfect panacea for what
might ail constitutional democracy.42 Besides, sauce for the goose is sauce
for the gander. Just as good people may forestall less democratic
constitutional revolutions, so bad people may forestall constitutional changes
that fulfill desirable constitutional aspirations. Consider the fate of the
Thirteenth Amendment, passed in an emergency, had the United States
adopted any of Professors Albert and Roznai’s proposals.
Executives adapt more conventional means for undermining
constitutions by capturing national bureaucracies. Professor Casey notes a
constitutional revolution occurred at the turn of the twentieth century with
the development of the administrative state. “Civil servants began to be
appointed on the basis that they were not mere tools of an incumbent political
executive but had an overriding duty to serve the state and public interest.”43
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Albert & Roznai, supra note 19, at 250.
Id. at 248–51.
See id. at 252–55.
See id. at 256.
Casey, supra note 20, at 258–59.
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The result was “a kind of internal separation of powers between political
actors and civil service personnel”44 that complimented the traditional
separation of powers between the executive and legislature as a means for
preserving democratic regimes. Professor Casey details how this regime is
being undermined throughout the world by executive attempts to crush
bureaucratic independence by controlling an increased number of
appointments, interfering with daily operations, and managing budgets.
While he properly notes an untrammeled bureaucracy threatens responsive
constitutional government,45 Professor Casey warns too much presidential
control “can be used as a potentially revolutionary pathway to hollow out
well-established principles associated with constitutional government, like
the rule of law, robust prosecutorial independence, freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, and free and fair electoral competition with a genuine
chance of party rotation of power.”46
Professor Novkov moves the analysis from textual and governmental
guardrails against constitutional revolutions that undermine constitutional
democracy to the crumbling cultural foundations of constitutional democracy
in the United States. She points out that “[c]onstitutional discourse depends
upon a shared vision of constitutionalism and a shared framework for
constitutional choice.”47 The Trump litigation campaign against the result of
the 2020 presidential election, Novkov details, was an assault on this shared
understanding of politics. Trump’s lawyers were more interested in creating
a public convinced against all evidence that the election was stolen than in
convincing mandarin justices.48 Their appeal to “race-based identity
nationalism”49 came very close to succeeding. A peaceful transition of power
occurred on January 20, 2021 (as opposed to January 6, 2021), only because
such groups as the Chamber of Commerce, Facebook, and the AFL-CIO
jointly helped organize a powerful campaign that helped maintain the
legitimacy of now-President Joseph Biden’s victory. A constitutional
revolution in the United States was averted, Novkov explains, “by private
companies that either portrayed their interests as taking a stand for
democracy or actions that limited their own potential liability in light of the
threat of legal actions against them.”50
44. Id. at 258.
45. Id. at 273–74.
46. Id. at 273.
47. Novkov, supra note 21, at 288. Professor Schweber makes a similar argument.
48. Id. at 279–80.
49. Id. at 288 (quoting Gwendoline Alphonso, “One People, Under One God, Saluting One
American Flag”: Trump, the Republican Party, and the Construction of American Nationalism, in
AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE TRUMP PRESIDENCY 55 (Zachary Callen & Philip
Rocco eds., 2020)).
50. Id. at 290.
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Professor Weill’s exploration of the Israeli Supreme Court’s decision to
demand an immediate vote on the Speaker of the Knesset51 demonstrates that
contests over which party to a constitutional dispute is the true revolutionary
faction remain vibrant. Weill regards the Israeli justices as “revolutionary”52
because their intervention in parliamentary affairs was unprecedented. The
incumbent Speaker’s decision to delay a vote, she details, was “in accordance
with the Knesset’s practice, which has a binding status according to Basic
Law: Knesset.”53 Professor Weill nevertheless acknowledges that the effort
by Likud partisans to maintain in office an indicted prime minister, Benjamin
Netanyahu, also threatened the constitutional foundations of Israel.
Proponents of the Israeli court’s decision, she notes, believed with reason that
Netanyahu’s “continued rule amounts to raising a black flag over Israel’s
democracy.”54 Perhaps the best interpretation of recent Israeli constitutional
politics is that in unprecedented times, all political actors must to some
degree be revolutionaries in the sense that all political actors must push
policies that vary to some degree from the previous commitments of the
inherited regime. The central teaching of the Weill essay is that courts should
proceed far more carefully than the Israeli Supreme Court in inherently
revolutionary times. She writes, “[j]udicial politicization risks undermining
the Court’s legitimacy because intervention in blatantly political matters
might paint the Court as partisan” and “might weaken political institutions
. . . from fully realizing the political process.”55
Professor Nackenoff details the possibility of a constitutional revolution
in the contemporary United States. The Constitution of the United States, in
her view, “includes a textual or moral commitment to expanding equality and
democracy.”56 Majority rule is at the core of that constitutional order. “A
commitment to popular democracy,” Nackenoff writes, “is incompatible with
entrenching minority control of election outcomes.”57 That minority control
may be upon the United States. Nackenoff points out how equal state
representation in the Senate,58 gerrymandering in House and state legislative
elections,59 and a Supreme Court packed by Republicans that “has given a
green light to states that want to introduce restrictions on ballot access”60 are
51. HCJ 2144/20 Movement for Quality Gov’t in Israel v. Knesset Speaker, Nevo Legal
Database (Isr.) (Mar. 23, 2020).
52. Weill, supra note 22, at 305.
53. Id. at 307.
54. Id. at 310.
55. Id. at 314.
56. Nackenoff, supra note 23, at 332.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 332–33.
60. Id. at 333.
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undermining democratic processes in the United States. This “constitutional
rot”61 is fueled by polarization. The most salient constitutional revolution in
the United States may be the disintegration of the commons necessary for
any constitutional regime. Nackenoff concludes, “[i]f different components
of the citizenry support the Constitution but embrace such dramatically
different visions of constitutional values and meanings that common ground
is neigh-impossible to find, there may be no ‘people.’”62
The contested nature of “constitutional revolution” affected the
immediate response in the United States to the effort by Trump supporters on
January 6, 2021, to interfere with congressional counting of Electoral College
votes. In an essay that appropriately puts “Revolution” in scare quotes,
Professor Goldenziel details how the “complicated web of authorities and
regulations contributed to the lack of a coherent response by the [Department
of Defense], National Guard, and law enforcement to the Capitol siege.”63
Many problems concerned “[t]he layers of bureaucracy necessary to deploy
the National Guard.”64 Others concerned a statutory framework that bars
federal troops from engaging in law enforcement,65 but permits the President
to use federal troops during an insurrection.66 Who was in charge and what
they could do depended on contested descriptions of what was happening at
the Capitol. Was January 6 normal lawbreaking, an insurrection, or a
constitutional revolution, each of which is governed by different legal
rules?67 Professor Goldenziel concludes with the intriguing observation that
January 6 threatened a constitutional revolution not imagined by either
Trump supporters or those who watched their television sets in horror. A
presidential order “deploy[ing] federal troops on U.S. soil,” she observes,
“would have changed constitutional norms of civil-military relations in the
United States forever,” so that “the greatest constitutional revolution at the
Capitol on January 6 is the one that did not occur.”68
Professor Zietlow champions far more democratic political change than
the January 6 mob. Her call for “a third Reconstruction” in the United States
driven by electoral politics69 illustrates the challenges in describing political
transformations that are grounded by reinterpretations of existing

61. See generally Jack M. Balkin, “Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Rot,” 77 MD. L.
REV. 147 (2017).
62. Nackenoff, supra note 23, at 335.
63. Goldenziel, supra note 24, at 336.
64. Id. at 349.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1385; see Goldenziel, supra note 24, at 338.
66. 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–35; see Goldenziel, supra note 24, at 339.
67. See Goldenziel, supra note 24, at 349–50.
68. Id.
69. Zietlow, supra note 25, at 364–65.
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constitutional text.70 Professor Zietlow’s anticipated reconstruction requires
“structural change to advance racial equality” and “improving the lives of
low-wage workers.”71 “Structural change” would appear to suggest a social
revolution, but Zietlow does not advocate for altering the constitutional text.
The Thirteenth Amendment provides the foundation for her third
reconstruction. Zietlow observes, “[a]busive policing and the subordination
of low-wage workers of color are both manifestations of the involuntary
servitude that continues to plague our nation almost two centuries after the
abolition of slavery.”72 So conceptualized, the third Reconstruction might be
best conceptualized as part of the ongoing revolution initiated by the civil
war amendments73 or even, as such Republicans as Abraham Lincoln
insisted, the ongoing revolution initiated by the Declaration of
Independence.74
Professor Goodman’s call for a constitutional revolution that will “more
effectively guarantee equitable representation”75 provides a related window
into the contested nature of constitutional revolutions. She first proposes a
federal statute increasing the number of representatives in the House that
would provide greater equity in the number of constituents represented by
each House member.76 She then proposes a constitutional amendment that
would substantially alter representation in the Senate so as to eliminate the
present representational advantage presently enjoyed by small states that are
far more rural and far more white than larger states.77 Professor Goodman
acknowledges that whether constitutional changes are revolutionary is in the
eye of the beholder.78 Her concluding sentence, which speaks of “a reconception of the notion of democratic representation,”79 suggests the
70. See JACOBSOHN & ROZNAI, supra note 7, at 143–82.
71. Zietlow, supra note 25, at 352.
72. Id. at 355.
73. See JACOBSOHN & ROZNAI, supra note 7, at 7.
74. Id. Thaddeus Stevens, when discussing Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, declared,
"I can hardly believe that any person can be found who will not admit that every one of these
provisions is just. They are all asserted in some form or other, in our Declaration of organic law."
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866). See Abraham Lincoln, Fragment on the
Constitution and the Union, in 4 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 15, at 169
(declaring with respect to the Declaration of Independence: “The assertion of that principle, at that
time, was the word, ‘fitly spoken’ which has proved an ‘apple of gold’ to us. The Union, and the
Constitution, are the picture of silver, subsequently framed around it. The picture was made, not to
conceal, or destroy the apple; but to adorn, and preserve it. The picture was made for the apple —
- not the apple for the picture”); see also Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, APPLE OF GOLD:
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES (1993).
75. Goodman, supra note 26, at 366.
76. Id. at 372–76.
77. Id. at 376–79.
78. Id. at 368–70.
79. Id. at 379.
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fundamental change in constitutional identity that Jacobsohn and Roznai
think is the defining characteristic of constitutional revolution. The second
paragraph, which asks Americans to “fulfill these promises”80 made in the
Preamble to the Constitution of the United States, suggests Professor
Goodman’s proposed constitutional reforms are better conceptualized as
faithful to the constitutional revolution that began in 1776.
Professor Zietlow’s and Professor Goodman’s dreams of progressive
constitutional reconstructions or revolutions may run aground on the shoals
of the counter-majoritarian constitutional hardball documented by Professor
Woodward-Burns. Mark Tushnet first coined the phrase “constitutional
hardball” to describe behavior inconsistent with previously understood
constitutional norms or conventions, but not inconsistent with existing
constitutional law.81 Professor Woodward-Burns notes how the Republican
party has responded to the demographic changes that might support a
progressive constitutional revolution by a combination of court-packing and
gerrymandering designed to keep government in Republican hands rather
than by seeking means to expand the party’s base. “The modern Republican
Party,” he observes, “frequently defeated in contests for the national popular
vote, is not clearly a populist coalition, but rather one that uses hardball to
inflate and entrench legislative seat share, increasing the likelihood of
counter-majoritarian outcomes in federal and state legislative elections.”82
The counter-majoritarian constitutional hardball Woodward-Burns describes
is not unique to the United States. Poland and Hungary have also witnessed
gross manipulation of constitutional and statutory rules to provide a rightwing party with far more power than the party’s popular support justifies.83
One common theme in several papers is the importance of political
culture. Most authors agree that societal commitments are the best guardrail
against bad constitutional revolutions. “Codified constitutional rules can
achieve their objectives,” Professors Albert and Roznai note, “only if they
are reinforced by an underlying political commitment rooted in respect for
the rule of law and for the presumably democratic procedures that led to their
enactment.”84 Professor Nackenoff agrees. She points out that “[t]he
Framers knew that institutional design alone could not maintain the
Constitution. Cultivating and maintaining support and even veneration for

80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 366.
Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 523 (2004).
Woodward-Burns, supra note 27, at 393.
See GABOR HALMAI, A Coup Against Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Hungary, in
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? 243 (Mark A. Graber et al., eds., 2018); Wojciech
Sadurski, Constitutional Crisis in Poland, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, supra, at 257.
84. Albert & Roznai, supra note 19, at 256.
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the Constitution among the populace, and internalization of norms among
elites, would be essential.”85
At this point, the essentially contested nature of constitutional
revolution is both a blessing and a curse. Essentially contested concepts
invite dialogue. They provide a shared vocabulary for discussing politics,
even if we dispute their meaning.86 Essentially contested concepts also invite
more vigorous forms of contestation. Schweber observes, “where two
incommensurate versions of constitutional coexist, the text for constitutional
revolution becomes something more disturbing; a test for conditions of the
possibility of constitutional civil war.”87 “[W]hen men differ in taste as to
kind of world they want,” Holmes chillingly wrote, “the only thing to do is
to go to work killing.”88

85. Nackenoff, supra note 23, at 330.
86. See generally HOWARD SCHWEBER, THE LANGUAGE OF LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
(2007).
87. Schweber, supra note 18, at 242.
88. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, J., to Harold Laski (Dec. 3, 1917), in 1 Holmes-Laski
Letters 85 (Mark DeWolfe Howe, ed., 1963).

